Holding and Analysis:
The Superior Court reversed the final protection order entered by the trial court under the PSVI and dismissed Victim’s 2022 petition with prejudice. The Court only addressed Offender’s first three issues, which it combined, as they all dealt with the PSVI statute of limitations. The Court held that Victim’s 2022 petition was barred by the statute of limitations. As a result of finding that Victim’s petition was barred by the statute of limitations, the Court did not address the remaining issues presented.
The standard of review used by the Court was whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner, was sufficient to sustain the trial court’s determination by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court noted that this was the same standard of review that would be used when addressing a protection order under the Protection From Abuse Act (hereinafter, “PFA Act”), 23 Pa. C.S.A, §6101, et. seq.
In addressing Offender’s statute of limitations claim, the Court employed a de novo standard of review as it was a question of law. The court recognized that the Supreme Court has held that PSVI protection orders are subject to the six-year statute of limitations contained in 42 Pa. C.S. §5527(b), which begins to run at the time that the cause of action occurs.
The Court recognized that the PSVI seeks to protect victims of sexual violence or intimidation by obtaining a stay away order or other appropriate relief. The Court then went on to discuss the process of seeking protection under the PSVI, which begins with the victim filing a petition with the court requesting protection from the offender due to sexual violence or intimidation. Once the petition is filed, a hearing is scheduled within ten business days. If the petitioner is successful at the hearing, the court may then issue an order or approve a consent agreement to protect either the petitioner, or another appropriate person, for a fixed period of time up to 36 months. Of note, pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. §62A07(c), the court may amend its order or agreement upon subsequent petition filed by either party and pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. §62A07(d), upon subsequent petition filed by the victim, the court may extend its order an unlimited number of times upon a finding that there is a continued risk of harm to the victim.
The Court recognized that, pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. §62A06, in order to successfully obtain a final no-contact order at the hearing after filing a PSVI claim, there are two prongs that must be met. The first prong is that the victim must assert that the offender committed an act of sexual violence or intimidation towards the petitioner, or another appropriate individual, and the second prong is that the victim must prove beyond a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner or another appropriate individual is at continued risk of harm from the offender.
The Court was tasked to decide which prong applies when determining when the six-year statute of limitations beings to run. Victim relied on the second prong in arguing that the statute of limitations begins to run on the most recent date demonstrating that the offender poses a continued risk of harm to the petitioner.
Victim further argued that the PSVI was useless in cases when the offender is incarcerated for more than six years if the Court relies on the first prong in determining when the statute of limitations begins to run. The Court did not agree with Victim’s contention.
The Court noted that, if the perpetrator was incarcerated, the victim could still file for a PSVI protective order within six years of the act of sexual violence or intimidation. More relevant to this case, the Court pointed out that the court may extend its original protection order an unlimited number of times upon a finding that there is a continued risk of harm to the victim.
Contrary to Victim who relied on the second prong, Offender contended that the first prong determines when the statute of limitations begins to run. Offender argued that the PSVI six-year statute of limitations begins to run from the date the sexual violence or intimidation occurs and, because the encounter at the flea market in June 2022 did not constitute sexual violence or intimidation, Victim’s 2022 petition was barred by the statute of limitations as it occurred more than six-years after the 2009 or 2010 incident of sexual violence or intimidation.
In determining which prong was determinative, the Court recognized that there was not much case law related to the PSVI but found the Supreme Court’s holding in K.N.B. v. M.D., 259 A.3d 341 (Pa. 2021), to be instructive. In K.N.B., a student was sexually assaulted. The victim in K.N.B. did not report the assault when it occurred in 2015, but reported the assault and filed for a PSVI protective order after encountering the perpetrator in 2018. The Supreme Court implied in its decision in K.N.B. that the statute of limitations began to run from the date the initial sexual violence or intimidation occurred.
Relying on K.N.B., the Court in Weatherholtz agreed with Offender’s argument that the first prong determines when the six-year statute of limitations begins to run. The Court further determined that the encounter between Victim and Offender in June 2022 did not entail sexual violence or intimidation as defined by 42 Pa. C.S. §62A06. Therefore, the Court held that the 2022 petition was barred by the statute of limitations as it was filed after the six-year statute of limitations had run.
Comments/Impressions:
The PFA Act gives victims of physical and sexual abuse the ability to obtain a Protection from Abuse Order (hereinafter, “PFA Order”) against their abuser. A PFA Order is limited in that it can only be filed against “family members or household members, sexual or intimate partners or persons who share biological parenthood.” 23 Pa. C.S.A. §6102(a).
In an effort to extend the protections provided by The PFA Act, the PSVI went into effect on July 1, 2015. The PSVI seeks to protect victims of sexual violence or intimidation by obtaining a stay away order. The PSVI stay away order is similar to a PFA Order, but fills the gap left behind by the PFA Act and only applies to victims who do not have any of the relationships enumerated in The PFA Act.
The Court in Weatherholtz recognized the purpose of the PSVI and the necessity to protect victims from sexual violence or intimidation. The Court also recognized that the protections offered by the PSVI are not automatic, and it is up to the victims to take advantage of the protections contained in the PSVI. This point seemed to be driven home by the Court when, after already determining when the statute of limitations begins to run, the Court went on and addressed Victim’s assertion that the PSVI is useless when an offender is incarcerated for more than six years.
In disagreeing with Victim’s assertion, the Court emphasized that the court may extend its original protection order an unlimited number of times upon a finding that there is a continued risk of harm to the victim. In this case, Victim failed to take advantage of the statutory protections and did not file for an extension of the protection order before it expired. By taking the time to address Victim’s assertion that the PSVI did not offer substantial protections to victims if the six-year statute of limitations began to run from the date the initial sexual violence or intimidation occurred, the Court seemed to be talking directly to Victim and advising her that she had an opportunity to take advantage of the PSVI protections by filing an extension of the protection order, and failed to do so.
Although the Court recognized the importance of the PSVI, it also recognized that victims need to be proactive and take advantage of all necessary protections contained in the PSVI. In this case, had Victim filed to extend the original protection order before it expired, it likely would have been granted and avoided the need to file the 2022 petition in the first place. Based on Victim’s arguments, it is clear that she blamed the perceived shortfalls of the PSVI as the reason why she no longer is protected under the PSVI.
The Court, however, seems to view Victim’s failure to file for an extension of the protection order, and not the PSVI itself, as the reason that Victim no longer has a protection order against Offender pursuant to the PSVI.
Obviously, the Weatherholtz case did not exist in 2018 when Plaintiff filed and was granted the original PSVI protection order. If the Weatherholtz holding had existed at that time and had been applied, it is likely that the 2018 protection order would not have been granted since six years had already elapsed from the initial incident in 2009 or 2010. Of course, the facts presented are limited, and it is possible that there were additional incidents between Victim and Offender between 2010 and 2018. Regardless, the Court in Weatherholtz seems of the opinion that Victim should have applied for a protection order while Offender was still in jail and then filed for an extension thereafter, if necessary.
